

English version of Appendix 4 of J. Brouwer & P. Bogaers 2018, [Why the KhAD-WAD thematic country report of 29 February 2000 is wrong and unreliable] *Waarom het KhAD-WAD ambtsbericht van 29 februari 2000 onjuist en onbetrouwbaar is*, *Nederlands Juristen Blad [Netherlands Law Review]* 2018/750, vol. 16, pp. 1104-1111. [www.abc1f.nl](http://www.abc1f.nl), at top of page (retrieved 29 December 2025)

**Appendix 4. Overview of the information that was publicly available at the end of 1999 and that contradicts the accusations against all former KhAD and WAD officers and NCOs, that was demonstrably available to the writers of the KhAD-WAD thematic country report of 2000, and that was ignored by them. See also Box 2 in the web version of Brouwer & Bogaers (2018).**

- 4.1 Passages in books that were used selectively for the introductory parts but ignored for the accusatory parts of the KhAD-WAD report (see the list of sources on p. 34-36 of the official English translation of the KhAD-WAD report)
- 4.2 Other sources used for the introductory sections of the KhAD-WAD official report and which do not support the conclusions of the official report with regard to all KhAD and WAD officers and NCOs:
- 4.3 Sources used for the introductory sections of the KhAD-WAD report that we were unable to consult, but from which the compilers of the official report also do not provide any quotations or references to support the conclusions of the KHAD-WAD report:
- 4.4 Ignored passages from earlier official reports issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs itself
- 4.5 Passages from the memoranda on which the KhAD0WAD official report is based, between the Netherlands Embassy in Islamabad and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in The |Hague

For every quote it is indicated which of the seven conclusions in the KhAD-WAD report,<sup>1</sup> as presented in the box in the NJB (Netherlands Law Review) article and in Box 1 in the associated more detailed online version, are contradicted by this quote. Where the number is in parentheses the contradiction is indirect. *To assist readers with an English-speaking background, the seven conclusions are repeated here. Only conclusion 3, about incentives for joining the KhAD as an officer, is largely supported by information in the publications referred to by the writers of the KhAD-WAD report.*

1. 2.4, paragraph 2: "Only PDPA [the communist state party] members who had been found to be very loyal and persons from pro-government families qualified for admission as officer to the KhAD or the WAD."

---

<sup>1</sup> Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Security Services in Communist Afghanistan (1978-1992)*. AGSA, KAM, KhAD and WAD. The Hague, 29 February 2000. Official English translation of the Dutch original 'Veiligheidsdiensten in communistisch Afghanistan (1978-1992). AGSA, KAM, KhAD en WAD'. [abc1f.nl](http://abc1f.nl), Verdere informatie, under Document 1 (retrieved 29 December 2025).

2. 2.4, paragraphs 3 and 4: "New KhAD and WAD officer recruits received very intensive training, the so-called *Parawachi*. A successful *Parawachi* would be followed by a trial period called *Azmajchi*. ... The *Parawachi* and the *Azmajchi* formed part of the KhAD/WAD officer training. Such training was, therefore, not available to ordinary informants. Persons considered particularly loyal by the KhAD and the WAD could apply for a shorter training."

3. 2.4, paragraph 5: "The rank of officer with the KhAD or the WAD provided considerable material benefits. Thus, an officer's salary was almost ten times as high as that of an ordinary official. In addition, this salary could, with impunity, be supplemented with money obtained through blackmail and bribery. Officers of the KhAD or the WAD were also exempted from serving in the Afghan government army and had free access, if they wished, to alcohol and prostitutes."

4. 2.7, paragraph 2: "As a first assignment, NCOs and officers<sup>44</sup> were posted to KhAD and WAD sections actively engaged in tracking down "elements that posed a threat to the state". KhAD and WAD agents regularly changed sections in order to prevent them acquiring too much power within a specific section. Sometimes agents were transferred several times a year. Anyone who had been with the KhAD or the WAD for more than a year had worked in at least two sections. An NCO or officer could only hope to be posted to a section or directorate carrying out activities of a more administrative or technical in nature<sup>45</sup> if he had proved his worth sufficiently during an initial assignment or assignments.

<sup>44</sup> For an overview of ranks within the KhAD and the WAD, see annex on page 32 and 33 of this situation report.

<sup>45</sup> E.g. The directorate dealing with foreign espionage. Such administrative and technical activities were usually very sensitive and therefore reserved for highly loyal NCOs and officers."

5. 2.7, paragraph 3: "As already stated in section 2.4 agents could not be promoted to officer within the KhAD or the WAD unless they had proved their unconditional loyalty to the Communist regime. This also applied to promotions available to KhAD and WAD officers after completing their training. Any officer promoted during his or her period of service was, therefore, involved in arrests, interrogations, torture and even executions."

6. 2.7, paragraph 4: "Like officers, NCOs could not function within the KhAD or the WAD if they were unwilling to take part in the systematic human rights violations by these organisations."

7. 2.7, paragraph 6: "The above suggests that all NCOs and officers were active in the macabre sections of the KhAD and WAD and were personally involved in the arrest, interrogation, torture, and even execution of suspects."

#### **4.1 Passages in books that were used selectively for the introductory parts but ignored for the accusatory parts of the KhAD-WAD report (see the list of sources on p. 34-36 of the official English translation of the KhAD-WAD report)**

##### ***Nyrop & Seekins (1986)*<sup>2</sup>**

1. p.258: about the many duties of the KhAD in addition to its 'secret service' work; contradicting conclusions 4 (5) 6 and 7 of the KhAD-WAD report of 2000:  
"... **Aside from its secret police work, KHAD supervised ideological education at schools**

---

<sup>2</sup> R.F. Nyrop & D.M. Seekins, *Afghanistan. A Country Study*, Washington DC, Department of the Army of the Department of Defense, 1986.

and colleges, ran a special school for war orphans, and recruited young men for the militia. Its importance to Moscow was reflected in the fact that it was chiefly responsible for the training of a new generation of Afghans who could be loyal to the Soviet Union. One observer, John Fullerton, calls it "the primary instrument used in the Sovietisation of the country." **KHAD was also responsible for co-opting religious leaders. It funded an official body known as the Religious Affairs Directorate and recruited pro-regime ulama and mosque attendants to spy on worshippers. Another important area was work with tribes and ethnic minorities. KHAD collaborated with the Ministry of Nationalities and Tribal Affairs to foster support for the regime in the countryside."**

2. p.325-326, last and first paragraphs: about relative numbers of officers and soldiers and that a shortage of loyal officers led to quick promotions for inexperienced -and sometimes illiterate- men; contradicting conclusions 1, 2 (4) 5, 6, 7 of the KhAD-WAD report of 2000:  
"One remedy that the regime used to attempt to cut down on the desertion rate was to increase the ratio of officers to enlisted men. **In certain cases, there could be as many as six officers to every 10 conscripts.** The former had the role of watching their men as well as commanding them, although officers with strong Khalqi sympathies could not be relied on to do this. **Shortage of loyal officers resulted in rapid promotion of inexperienced -and sometimes illiterate- men."**
3. p.328-329, last and first paragraphs, that the KhAD was under the control of the KGB and that *many* [not all, not most] employees received intelligence training [not interrogation training] from the KGB en East German intelligence specialists, and that the mission of the KhAD was multi-faceted with examples of non-secret service activities; contradicting conclusions (2) 4 (5) (6) 7 of the KhAD-WAD report of 2000):  
"In the mid-1980s KHAD enjoyed a formidable measure of autonomy in relation to other Afghan state institutions. **It was, however, under the de facto control of the Soviet secret police, the KGB.** The organization was generously funded. Its cadres - estimated by Western observers as numbering anywhere between 25,000 and 60,000 persons- formed an intelligence network throughout Afghanistan and even beyond the country's borders. This included a uniformed KHAD brigade of 2,000 men. **Many received training from the KGB and East German intelligence specialists.** Its mission was multi-faceted, including the detection and suppression of anti-regime elements, the gathering of intelligence, and the sponsorship of organizations designed to win the population's adherence to PDPA's ideology and programs. **KHAD was responsible for the ideological education of new PDPA members and armed forces personnel. It set up a special school for the education of the children of party members and war orphans who were routinely shipped off to the Soviet Union for further education. It supervised the teaching of compulsory courses in ideology at Kabul University, the technical colleges and secondary schools.** KHAD personnel on the campuses ostensibly worked as 'information officers.' KhAD was the bulwark of 'official' Islam. **It provided subsidies for the Religious Affairs Directorate, an organization designed to use Islamic symbols to gain popular support for the regime."**

### **Bradsher (1999)<sup>3</sup>**

4. p.137-138, last and first paragraphs; about the size of the KhAD, other reasons than loyalty to the party to join the KhAD, about the employment conditions within the KhAD, and about the lack of proof for ideological commitment among KhAD recruits; contradicting conclusions 1 (2) 3 (4) (5) (6) 7 of the KhAD-WAD report of 2000:  
**"Within a few years KhAD grew to between 15 000 and 20 000 personnel, and by 1989 it numbered an estimated 25 000. Men joined for exemption from military conscription, ten times as much pay as government clerical workers [not 'ordinary officials' as stated in the KhAD-WAD report] and access to liquor, prostitutes, and extortion money. There was, however, little evidence of ideological commitment."<sup>111</sup>**  
According to endnote 111 in Bradsher (1999), the second part of this passage is originally from Coldren (1985). That original passage was as follows:<sup>4</sup>

<sup>3</sup> H.S. Bradsher, *Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention*, Oxford University Press, 1999.

<sup>4</sup> L.O. Coldren, 'Afghanistan in 1985. The sixth year of the Russo-Afghan War' Asian Survey 1986 XXVI, pp. 235-245, bottom of p.238. [https://drive.google.com/file/d/1A-dihUXdVl\\_jUxLVXQzsa8AUtiEQ\\_HH5/edit](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1A-dihUXdVl_jUxLVXQzsa8AUtiEQ_HH5/edit)

"The military has deteriorated under the Soviets, but the **KGB-trained secret police, the KHAD (Persian acronym for State Information Service), has flourished to the point where it probably rivals the military services in size. Recruitment is not an apparent problem. Exemption from conscription is a major incentive as are a pay scale ten times greater than Ministry clerical workers [not 'ordinary officials' as stated in the KhAD-WAD report], weapons, and access to cars, liquor, prostitutes, and extortion money. There is little evidence of ideological commitment among KHAD agents**, but the secret police are not as prone as the military to defection or cooperation with the resistance. While KHAD installations are attacked and suspected KHAD officers and informers often assassinated, **being in KHAD is probably safer than being in the military.**"

Coldren was a career foreign service officer who at the US Embassy in Kabul as political officer from 1974 to 1979 and as deputy chief of mission from 1982 to 1984.<sup>5</sup>

#### **Rubin (1995)<sup>6</sup>**

5. p.127-128, last and first paragraphs, about associations between being in the employ of the KhAD and (forced) membership of the PDPA; the requirement of loyalty to the party to be allowed to join the KhAD is not mentioned; contradicting conclusion 1 of the KhAD-WAD report of 2000:  
**"Later [PDPA] recruits came largely from the security services**, so that by 1985 official sources claimed that 65 percent of party members were working in the army, Sarandoy, militia, or KhAD. Many low-level government employees were also **pressured into taking out party cards**; as a result, membership figures were inflated and, for the first time, included a small number of members classified as workers and peasants."
6. p.131 paragraph 4, about conscripts within the KhAD, i.e. only fanatical communist recruits; contradicting conclusion 1 of the KhAD-WAD report of 2000:  
**"Along with factional conflict in the command structure, the army faced a persistent problem of maintaining its size through conscription. Conscripts also served in the Ministry of Interior and KhAD."**
7. p.133 paragraph 3, on the size and growth of the KhAD; contradicting conclusions (2) 4 (5) 6, 7 of the KhAD-WAD report of 2000: how can a 130 percent increase in personnel in one year (from 5,800 to 13,600 enlisted personnel, non-commissioned officers, and officers) all go through the Parwachi training period and Azmajchi training period and then all go through the interrogation departments of the KhAD [at least all the new officers]?):  
**"According to one estimate, by 1987 WAD employed 15,000 to 30,000 professionals and about 100,000 paid informers.<sup>25</sup> The numbers may seem high, but government statistics indicate that they may be in the right order of magnitude. Official figures for 1980-1981 show that the Office of the Prime Minister (which included KhAD) employed 5,802 people**, of whom 2,301 (40 percent) were in the provinces; **by the next year**, although total number of government employees (not including the Ministry of Defence) actually decreased slightly, **the number of employees in the Prime Ministry increased over 130 percent. to 13,596**, of whom 9,042 (67 percent) were in the provinces.<sup>26</sup> It is quite probable that most of the nearly 14,000 employees of the Prime Minister's Office in 1981-82 were working for KhAD, and the number of employees continued to grow."  
[Note 26 cites the Statistical Year Book 1981-1982 of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan as the source for these figures]
8. p.133 paragraph 4, on the decisive role of the KGB within the KhAD and on information from former prisoners: no mention by former prisoners of the rotation of KhAD employees; contradicting conclusions (2) 4 (5) 6, 7 of the KhAD-WAD report of 2000:  
**"Each KhAD official had one or more KGB advisers**. These advisers were so numerous that they had their own headquarters in the Dar-ul-Aman area of Kabul. **Former prisoners have reported that advisers had offices in interrogation centers and that they sometimes intervened indirectly in interrogations."**

---

(retrieved 25 December 2025).

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, bottom of p. 235.

<sup>6</sup> B.R. Rubin, *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan. State Formation and Collapse in the International System*. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1995.

9. p.137 paragraph 2, on the pacification measures of the KhAD and the punitive measures of the Afghan army; contradicting conclusions 4 (5) 6, 7 of the KhAD-WAD report of 2000:  
"In these areas, the government applied a rural counterinsurgency strategy that involved both **punitive measures carried out by the military and pacification measures carried out by KhAD.**"
10. p.137 paragraph 4, that the KhAD was an instrument of oppression, but primarily an intelligence service that did not arbitrarily torture and murder suspected opponents; contradicting conclusions 4 (5) 6, 7 of the KhAD-WAD report of 2000:  
"**Although KhAD was indeed an organ of repression, it was above all an intelligence organization, operating, as its name implied, on the basis of information about the population. Acquisition and storage of information can in part substitute for the application of physical coercion by rendering smaller quantities of coercion more effective, and unlike its predecessors, AGSA and KAM, KhAD did not indiscriminately torture and murder suspected opponents. Torture was one of a variety of methods for extracting information, playing a role (which diminished over time, if it never disappeared) in an increasingly routinised system of surveillance and control.**"

#### **4.2 Other sources used for the introductory sections of the KhAD-WAD official report and which do not support the conclusions of the official report with regard to all KhAD and WAD officers and NCOs:**

Amnesty International (1986, 1988, 1991)<sup>7,8,9</sup>, Human Rights Watch (1991)<sup>10</sup>, UN Special Rapporteur (1985, 1986, 1987a, 1987b, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992)<sup>11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19</sup>

#### **4.3 Sources used for the introductory sections of the KhAD-WAD report that we were unable to consult, but from which the compilers of the official report also do not provide any quotations or references to support the conclusions of the KHAD-WAD report:**

- Adamec (1991)<sup>20</sup>, Fisher et al. (1999)<sup>21</sup>, Klass (1987)<sup>22</sup>, Laber & Rubin (1988)<sup>23</sup>

#### **4.4 Ignored passages from earlier official reports issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs itself**

---

<sup>7</sup> Afghanistan. Torture of Political Prisoners. ASA/11/04/86. London, Amnesty International, November 1986.

<sup>8</sup> Afghanistan. Unlawful Killings and Torture. ASA 11/02/88. London, Amnesty International, May 1988.

<sup>9</sup> Afghanistan. Reports of Torture and Long-term Detention Without Trial. ASA 11/01/91. London, Amnesty International, March 1991.

<sup>10</sup> Afghanistan. The Forgotten War. Human Rights Abuses and Violations of the Laws of War Since the Soviet Withdrawal. New York, Washington, Asia Watch/Human Rights Watch, February 1991.

<sup>11</sup> Report on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan prepared by the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Felix Ermacora, in accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution 1984/55. E/CN.4/1985/21. New York, United Nations, 19 February 1985.

<sup>12</sup> Report on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan prepared by the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Felix Ermacora, in accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution 1985/38. E/CN.4/1986/24. New York, United Nations, 17 February 1986.

<sup>13</sup> Report on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan prepared by the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Felix Ermacora, in accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution 1986/40. E/CN.4/1987/22. New York, United Nations, 19 February 1987a.

<sup>14</sup> Situation of human rights in Afghanistan. Note by the Secretary General. A/42/667. New York, United Nations, 23 October 1987b.

<sup>15</sup> Report on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan prepared by the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Felix Ermacora, in accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution 1987/58. E/CN.4/1988/25. New York, United Nations, 26 February 1988.

<sup>16</sup> Report on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan prepared by the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Felix Ermacora, in accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution 1988/67. E/CN.4/1989/24. New York, United Nations, 16 February 1989.

<sup>17</sup> Report on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan prepared by the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Felix Ermacora, in accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution 1989/67. E/CN.4/1990/25. New York, United Nations, 31 January 1990.

<sup>18</sup> Report on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan prepared by the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Felix Ermacora, in accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution 1990/53. E/CN.4/1991/31. New York, United Nations, 28 January 1991.

<sup>19</sup> Report on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan submitted by Mr. Felix Ermacora, Special Rapporteur, in accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution 1991/78. E/CN.4/1992/33. New York, United Nations, 17 February 1992.

<sup>20</sup> L.W. Adamec, *Historical Dictionary of Afghanistan. Asian Historical Dictionaries No. 5.* Metuchen N. J., London, Scarecrow Press, 1991.

<sup>21</sup> W.B. Fisher, A. Mukarram, K. Rafferty, *Afghanistan. The Far East and Australasia 1999.* 1999.

<sup>22</sup> R. Klass (ed.), *Afghanistan. The Great Game Revisited.* New York, Freedom House, 1987.

<sup>23</sup> J. Laber, B.R. Rubin, *A Nation is Dying. Afghanistan under the Soviets, 1979-87.* Evanston IL Northwestern University Press, 1988.

**Country report by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated 4 March 1998**

11. pp. 33-34 footnote 88, concerning 20-23 KhAD and WAD directorates, not just the six directorates (all operational) mentioned in the 2000 official report;<sup>24</sup> many of the 'extra' directorates were non-operational support directorates; non-interrogation tasks such as ideological training for operational units of the KhAD are also mentioned; contradicting conclusions 4, 5, 6, 7 of the KhAD-WAD report of 2000:  
**"The KHAD was established in 1980 on the model of the KGB. The Department of State Security consisted of more than 20 directorates.** The headquarters were located in Kabul, with regional offices in the provinces. The military KHAD, which initially fell under the Ministry of the Interior, was merged with the KHAD directorate within the Ministry of Defense in 1984. **In January 1986, the KHAD became a separate ministry.** The KHAD departments were then given the official name Riasat. There **were approximately 23 directorates (3 military and 20 civilian).**"
12. p.34 first paragraph, on the ambiguous use of the name KhAD, for the secret service departments and for the entire organization which also had many other tasks; contradicting conclusions 4 (5) 6, 7 of the KhAD-WAD report of 2000:  
**"In addition to the secret service in the narrow sense,** the KHAD was also responsible for the ideological training of new party members and soldiers. Furthermore, the KHAD also ran schools for children of party members and war orphans, who were often sent to the former Soviet Union. The KHAD also supervised ideological education at the University of Kabul."
13. p.34 paragraph 4, that many KHAD employees, but not all and not most, participated in human rights violations (contradicting conclusions 4, 5, 6, 7 of the KhAD-WAD report of 2000:  
**"It should not go unmentioned that many KHAD officials engaged in activities that could be considered to fall under the exclusion clause (1F) of the Refugee Convention.** The top echelons of the KHAD were certainly aware of the gross human rights violations. Those who did not leave the organization at the time are also hierarchically responsible for the continuation of the violations."

**Country report by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated November 3, 1998**

14. p.13 note 37, that it is particularly difficult to say whether an individual former employee of the KhAD has committed human rights violations; contradicting conclusions 4, 5, 6, 7 of the official report 2000:  
**"... Specific questions about whether an individual asylum seeker held a position within the Khad and whether the person concerned may have committed crimes against humanity are extremely difficult to answer.** It should be borne in mind that **this security service had some 150,000 employees** and operated in secret."

**Country report by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated 16 September 1999**

15. p.9 footnote 13, that party membership was not essential for a government position (potentially contradicting conclusion (1) of the KhAD-WAD report of 2000:  
**"Someone who held a government position in Afghanistan during the communist regime was therefore not automatically a party member."**
16. p.10 footnote 17, that the policy towards opponents of the regime did indeed change after the announcement of the policy of national reconciliation; contradicting conclusion 8 of the KhAD-WAD report of 2000:  
**"Strictly speaking, in communist jargon, 'purging' means 'removal from the party ranks'. This is usually a euphemism. In the early years of the communist regime of Presidents Taraki, Amin, and Karmal, 'purging' often meant a long prison sentence or execution. This changed somewhat during Najibullah's presidency. Particularly after he launched his policy of national reconciliation in 1987, punitive measures were mostly limited to social**

---

24

Security services in communist Afghanistan (1978-1992). AGSA, KAM, KhAD and WAD, The Hague, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 29, 2000. p.13, first paragraph.  
<http://www.migratieweb.nl/f/Afghanistan%20-%20veiligheidsdiensten%20-%2029%20Feb%202000%20%5Bve02001091%5D.pdf>

degradation, for example in the form of loss of membership of the DVPA, dismissal or exile. ...".

17. p. 10, paragraphs 1-2, that the Parwachi and Azmajchi periods did not only apply to (prospective) officers of the KhAD and WAD (contradicting conclusion 2 of the KhAD-WAD report of 2000:

"Membership of the DVPA in Afghanistan was reserved for a select group. Members of the DVPA had proven that their loyalty to the party was beyond doubt. **Anyone interested in joining the Communist Party, or nominated by another person as a future member, had to go through at least the following stages. First, the prospective member became a 'friend of the party'.** This designation meant that someone was in principle sympathetic to the DVPA and willing to join the party. However, the DVPA did not know whether the person in question was trustworthy. To prove his (or her) loyalty, the prospective member had to join either the youth organization *Sazman-i-Jawanan* or the grassroots organization *Sazman-i-Awalya*, depending on his age.

**If the prospective member had sufficiently proven his loyalty as a 'friend of the party', he could be nominated as a candidate member of the DVPA.** If this was not already the case, it almost always meant that he was enlisted in the *Sazman-i-Awalya*. Once again, the prospective member was asked to spy on family members, friends, acquaintances, colleagues, fellow students, etc. for the Afghan security service. ..."

18. - p.48 paragraph 3, that it was normal to give military personnel a relatively high salary, and that the Taliban did so too (contradicting the possible misunderstanding regarding conclusion (3) of the 2000 official report in part 2 above, that only employees of the KhAD and WAD received a relatively high salary):

"... Many Pashtun men still volunteer to join the Taliban armed forces. **Ideological motives are not the only driving force here; another important factor is that the Taliban pay their soldiers a salary that is considerably higher than the average Afghan monthly wage.**"

19. - p.53 paragraph 2, which only refers to *knowledge of* human rights violations by every KhAD employee, not to *participation in or responsibility for them* (contradicting conclusions (4) (5) (6) 7 of the KhAD-WAD report of 2000:

"... It is virtually inconceivable that anyone within the KHAD, regardless of their level of employment, **was unaware** of the gross human rights violations committed by this service."  
**Country report by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated November 3, 1998**

**Official report about an individual Afghan by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated 28 September 1999, DPC/AM adm. no. 654096**

**Note that this report was written after the memorandum of 1 September 1999, that forms the basis for the KhAD-WAD report, was received by the Ministry. See also section 4.5 below.**

20. p.1 paragraph 2, that it is impossible to verify what members of the middle and lower echelons of the KhAD and the WAD had done; contradicting conclusions 4, 5, 6, 7 of the official report 2000:

"It is not possible on our part to confirm whether the person concerned held the aforementioned positions within the KHAD/WAD in the period from 1982 to 1992. **Detailed research into the employment history of middle and lower management of the KHAD/WAD is not possible.**"

21. p.3 paragraph 1, which states that certain operational departments were less involved in specific human rights violations, from which the logical conclusion is that non-operational departments were not involved in specific human rights violations at all; contradicting conclusions (4) (5) (6) 7 of the KhAD-WAD report of 2000:

"Within the KhAD/WAD, there were some departments that were less focused on arresting, interrogating, and mistreating suspects; **one example is the department responsible for foreign espionage. Individuals who worked in these departments were much less involved in specific human rights violations.**"

22. p.3, paragraph 1, continuation-1, that *in general* there was rotation, not by everyone, and in order to prevent the building of a power base, not to allow everyone to torture; contradicting conclusions 4 (5) 6, 7 of the KhAD-WAD report of 2000:

"However, in order to prevent individuals from building up a large power base within a particular department, KHAD/WAD employees **generally** had **to be rotated** within the organization."

23. p.3, paragraph 1, continuation-2, that *virtually* all KhAD/WAD (non-commissioned) officers were involved in *mistreatment*, so not *all* and not in *torture*; contradicting conclusions 4, 5, 6, 7 of the KhAD-WAD report of 2000:

"This means that **virtually all** KHAD/WAD non-commissioned officers and officers were involved in the arrest, interrogation, **mistreatment, and sometimes execution** of suspects."

**Official report about an individual Afghan by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated 12 November 1999, DPC/AM admin. no. 644116**

**Note that this report was written after the memorandum of 1 September 1999, that forms the basis for the KhAD-WAD report, was received by the Ministry. See also section 4.5 below.**

24. p.3 paragraph 2, that only the *top* echelons of the Ministry of State Security can be said to generally have been guilty of crimes against the Afghan people or against individual Afghans, not the lower and middle ranks; contradicting conclusions 4, 5, 6, 7 of the KhAD-WAD report of 2000:

"That being said, the Taliban do not leave all former communists alone. This applies in particular to those among them who in the past have very emphatically and prominently profiled themselves as communists, worked closely with the Soviets, had a high-level influence on policy, took a clear stand against Islam, or **are known to have committed crimes against the Afghan people in general or certain Afghans in particular. This description generally applies only to senior officials** of the DVPA and **not to the lower and middle ranks of this party.** For clarification, **senior officials are understood to be persons who have been members of** the Politburo, the Central Committee, and the Revolutionary Council of the DVPA, the **senior officials of the Ministries of Defense, Interior, Justice, and State Security**, the top of the communist military apparatus, and the top of the communist administration of cities, districts, and provinces in Afghanistan. ..."

#### **4.5 Passages from the memoranda on which the KhAD-WAD official report is based, between the Dutch Embassy in Islamabad and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in The Hague**

**Memorandum from the Deputy Chief of Mission in Islamabad to DPC/AM [a department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in The Hague], cc. IND/Country Desk Afghanistan, NOVO team, dated 1 September 1999, received by DPC/AM on 6 September 1999; subject indication redacted prior to release in response to a Fol request**

25. p.3 paragraph 4, that promotion *to* officer (i.e. not as an officer) was only possible if one had proven one's loyalty by interrogating/abusing (and therefore not torturing) suspects; contradicting conclusions 5 and 7 of the KhAD-WAD report of 2000:

**"Promotion to officer could not take place unless one had demonstrated one's loyalty in a concrete manner.** In the context of the KHAD/WAD, this specifically implied that suspects **had to have been interrogated/abused** in order to obtain information."

26. p.4 paragraph 1, that KhAD/WAD employees *generally* had to rotate, so not always, and that this was done to prevent the establishment of a personal power base, which many KhAD/WAD officers and non-commissioned officers would not have been involved in; contradicting conclusions 5, 6, 7 of the KhAD-WAD report of 2000:

**"In general,** however, KHAD/WAD employees had to rotate in order to prevent them from building up a large power base within a particular department."

27. Furthermore, this memorandum, insofar as it has been released, does not mention compulsory initial placement in an interrogation department of the KhAD/WAD (contra conclusion 4 of the KhAD-WAD report of 2000.

**Memorandum van de Chef de Poste in Islamabad, op basis van de inhoud aan het ministerie in Den Haag, d.d. 20 december 1999**

28. unnumbered page, note 26, paragraph 1, that *the opinion prevails* within the Afghan community (outside Afghanistan, otherwise one would not have spoken of the 'Afghan community', and presumably in Pakistan given the location of the embassy, and thus strongly influenced by the anti-communist Taliban) that all non-commissioned officers are guilty of human rights violations, so there is no evidence, nor have any specific indications been put forward; contradicting conclusions 6 and 7 of the KhAD-WAD report of 2000:

"Enquiries with the above-mentioned sources have revealed that within the Afghan [word or words redacted] community [word or words redacted], **the prevailing opinion is** that all non-commissioned officers and officers of the KhAD/WAD have actively violated human rights. It was also impossible for non-commissioned officers to function within the KhAD/WAD if they did not wish to participate in the systematic abuse and human rights violations carried out within this service.."

***Memorandum from [redacted] at the Embassy in Islamabad to DPC/AM in The Hague dated 7 February 2000, received by DPC/AM on February 14, 2000; subject reference redacted prior to release in response to a Fol request***

29. p.2 paragraph 3-5:

"In addition the following literature studies were used to support our investigation:

- Henry S. Bradsher. Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention. Oxford University Press, Oxford/Karachi, 1999;
- Barnett R. Rubin and Jeri Laber. A nation is dying. Afghanistan under the Soviets. Northwestern University Press, Evanston, Illinois, USA, 1988;
- Barnett R. Rubin. Fragmentation of Afghanistan. State Formation and Collapse in the International System, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1995;
- Barnett R. Rubin. The search for peace in Afghanistan. From buffer state to failed state. Yale University Press, New Haven, 1995;
- Hafizullah Emadi. State, revolution and superpowers in Afghanistan. Royal Book Company, Karachi, 1997;
- Thomas T. Hammond. Red Flag over Afghanistan. The communist coup, the Soviet invasion and the consequences. Westview Press, Colorado, 1984.
- Edgar O'Ballance. Afghan Wars. What Britain gave up and the Soviet Union lost. Brassey's Press, London, 1993.

Zie de kopjes AGSA, KAM, KhAD, WAD en KGB bij de index van bovenstaande boeken voor specifieke informatie. In zake de beantwoording van uw vragen 1 t/m 6 (pagina 1 t/m 4) van uw memorandum d.d. 21 januari 2000 is dezerzijds gebruik gemaakt van informatie die via bovenstaande bronnen is aangeleverd."

***Memorandum from the Chef de Poste in Islamabad to DPC/AM in The Hague dated March 2, 2000; subject reference redacted prior to release in response to a Fol request***

30. p.6: repetition of the above passage no. 29 from the memorandum of February 7, 2000, listing sources used for the investigation for the KhAD-WAD official report, including the comment "See the entries AGSA, KAM, KhAD, WAD, and KGB in the index of the above books for specific information."

***Memorandum from [redacted] in Islamabad to DPC/AM Regional Coordinator Middle East I dated 14 April 2000, received by DPC/AM on 18 April 18 2000; subject reference redacted prior to release in response to a Fol request***

31. - p.3 paragraph 1:

"Despite the fact that the information we have gathered is very detailed, our findings and conclusions do not differ from those previously reported by the Special Rapporteur for Afghanistan of the United Nations Human Rights Committee, the US State Department, Amnesty International, Helsinki Watch, Human Rights Watch, and various leading academics (including Barnett J. [sic] Rubin, and Henry Bradsher) regarding the practices of the Afghan state security services. See the bibliography in my memorandum [words redacted] dated 2 March 2000."

---